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PREFACE 
Standard  s e t t i n g  i s  one of  t h e  most commonly used r egu l a -  
t o r y  t o o l s  t o  l i m i t  d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  of t e c h n o l o g i e s  on human 
h e a l t h ,  s a f e t y ,  and p sycho log i ca l  wel l -being.  S t anda rds  a l s o  
work a s  major  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  development,  p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of energy.  The t r a d e - o f f s  t o  be made 
between economic, e n g i n e e r i n g ,  environmenta l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  h igh  u n c e r t a i n t y  abou t  environmenta l  e f f e c t s ,  
and t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  of groups  invo lved  i n  s t a n d a r d  
s e t t i n g ,  make t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  t a s k  exceed ing ly  d i f f i c u l t .  
R e a l i z i n g  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  t h e  Volkswagen Foundation spon- 
s o r ed  a  r e s e a r c h  s u b t a s k  i n  IIASA's Energy Systems Program on 
Procedures  for t h e  E s t a b Z i s h m e n t  o f  S t a n d a r d s .  The ob j ec -  
t i v e s  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  a r e  t o  ana lyze  e x i s t i n g  p rocedures  f o r  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  and t o  deve lop  new t echn iques  t o  improve t h e  
r e g u l a t o r y  d e c i s i o n  making p roce s s .  The r e s e a r c h  performed under 
t h i s  p r o j e c t  i nc lude :  
i) p o l i c y  a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  
s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  and comparisons w i t h  o t h e r  
r e g u l a t o r y  t o o l s  ; 
ii) c a s e  s t u d i e s  of ongoing o r  p a s t  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
p roce s se s  ( e . g .  o i l  d i s c h a r g e  s t a n d a r d s  o r  n o i s e  
s t a n d a r d s )  ; 
iii) development o f  formal  methods f o r  s t anda rd  s e t t i n g  
based on d e c i s i o n  and game t heo ry ;  
i v )  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  methods t o  r e a l  wor ld  s t a n d a r d  
s e t t i n g  problems. 
The p r e s e n t  Research Memorandum i s  one i n  a  series o f  papers  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  development and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  d e c i s i o n  theo- 
re t ic  methods t o  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  I t  p r e s e n t s  t h e  fo rmal  b a s i s  
f o r  m u l t i s t a g e  game t h e o r e t i c  a n a l y s e s  o f  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  
problems a s  w e l l  as some i l l u s t r a t i v e  examples. 

ABSTRACT 
Th i s  paper p r e s e n t s  a game-theoret ic  approach t o  modeling 
environmental  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  procedures  under s p e c i f i c  consi -  
d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  dynamic c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n  i n  environmental  
d e c i s i o n s .  Three i d e a l i z e d  d e c i s i o n  u n i t s  are cons idered ,  t h e  
r e g u l a t o r ,  producer  and impactee u n j t s :  The r e g u l a t o r  has  t o  
f i x  t h e  s t anda rd .  Th i s  s t anda rd  causes  a  f i n a n c i a l  burden t o  
t h e  producer ,  who r e l e a s e s  p o l l u t a n t s  t o  t h e  environment. By 
means of t h e  s t a n d a r d  t h e  impactee has  t o  be p r o t e c t e d  a g a i n s t  
t h i s  p o l l u t i o n .  
The s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  i s  a  m u l t i s t a g e  model f o r  a  non-ccooper- 
a t i v e  t h r e e  person game. A f t e r  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h i s  model 
t h e  range o f  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  is  i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  c a s e s  of North- 
Sea o i l ,  su lphu r  d iox ide ,  carbon d iox ide ,  and no i se .  S ince  
any game-theoret ic  a n a l y s i s  i nc ludes  t h e  cho ice  of  a  s o l u t i o n  
concept ,  a  c l a s s  o f  concep ts  i s  d i scus sed .  The l a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
paper  c o n t a i n s  a  b r i e f  survey of  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  two m u l t i s t a g e  
c a s e s  where t h e  r e l evance  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  concep ts  is  demons- 
t r a t e d .  
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A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEXJORK FOR DYNANIC STANDARD 
SETTING PROCEDURES 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the 1960s environmental agencies have been 
set up all over the world establishing guidelines and regulations 
that should help to limit effects of modern technologies that 
may be detrimental to the environment. New organizations, regu- 
latory tools, standards, incentives, and procedures were rapidly 
introduced which often had a substantial im~act on the industrial 
investment and operating costs as well as on the speed at which 
new technologies were introduced. After an initial period of 
zealous environmental decision making the time has come now to 
reflect on this development. questions such as the following 
are raised both by environmental researchers and decision makers: 
How good are our procedures for assessing impacts on the envir- 
onment? How well do we take uncertainties into account when 
making regulatory decisions? Are 1-ong-term environmental and 
economic effects of our decision making properly taken into 
account? 
Researchers and experts of environmental agencies began to 
realize that the difficulties in environmental decision mzking 
often lead to decisions that are less rational than one would 
wish. The problem areas most often mentioned are the vast 
uncertainties that exist about the environmental effects of 
pallutants, the difficulty in assessing risks of accidents of 
scales never encountered before, the conflicting interests of 
groups involved in and affected by regulatory decision making, 
and the difficulty in assessing long-term environmental and 
economic effects. These problems call for new institutional 
and methodological approaches to environmental decision making 
(see National Academy of Sciences, ,1975, National Research 
Council, 1977). 
This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to the modeling 
of environmental standard setting decisions, considering speci- 
fically the dynamic conflict situation in environmental decisions. 
Three decision-making units are considered in the game theo- 
retic model: the regulator, producer, and impactee units; such 
a structure has in fact also been proposed in connection with 
risk analysis (H. Otway, P. Pahner, 1976). The reguZator, who 
may consist of a regulatory agency where various administrative 
units and experts interact, has to fix a standard. This standard 
usually causes a financial burden to the producer, who may 
consist of several energy producers emitting gaseous pollutants, 
or any other enterprise polluting the environment. The standard 
serves to protect the impactee consisting of the population 
affected by the pollution. 
Under s p e c i a l  assumpt ions  about  t h e  p a r t i e s  invo lved  one 
a r r i v e s  a t  a c o n f l i c t  among s e v e r a l  peop l e  t h a t  be longs  t o  t h e  
c l a s s  o f  problems t r e a t e d  by game t h e o r y .  The assumpt ions  are 
e s s e n t i a l l y  t w o :  "Each i n d i v i d u a l  ha s  a u t i l i t y - f u n c t i o n  t h a t  
he  s t r i v e s  t o  maximize;" and "Each i n d i v i d u a l  is  a b l e  t o  g e r c e i v e  
t h e  gaming s i t u a t i o n . "  These t w o  a r e  o f t e n  subsumed uncler t h e  
ph r a s e  "The t h e o r y  assumes r a t i o n a l  p l a y e r s "  ( R .  D .  Luce, 
H. R a i f f a ,  1957, ch .  1 ) .  The problem o f  how t o  a r r i v e  a t  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  from g i v e n  p r e f e r e n c e  p a t t e r n s  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  by 
d e c i s i o n  t h e o r y  ( s e e  e . g .  D.  v .  W i n t e r f e l d t ,  1978,  1 ) I  and w i l l  
n o t  be  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  paper .  I n s t e a d  t h e  purpose  o f  t h i s  
paper  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  an  app rop r5a t e  game- theore t i c  framework 
f o r  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g ,  and t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  game- 
t h e o r e t i c  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  problem. 
The s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  is  a m u l t i s t a g e  model f o r  a  game between 
t h e  t h r e e  p l a y e r s :  r e g u l a t o r ,  p roducer ,  and impac tee .  I t  is 
hoped t h a t  t h e  model i s  g e n e r a l  enough t o  e r n b r s c ~  some essent is l  
f e a t u r e s  o f  most problems o f  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g .  Fur thermore  it 
shou ld  p e r m i t  pa ramete r  a n a l y s i s  i n  a  way t h a t  c r u c i a l  uncer-  
t a i n t i e s  abou t  h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  and economic development a s  w e l l  
a s  abou t  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o q s  cen be  i d e n t i f i e d .  Th i s  pa ramete r  
a n a l y s i s  seems t o  be i n d i s p e n s a b l e  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  t h e  r e c Ju l a to r l s  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  s i n c e  h i s  u t i l i t y  k n c t i o n  shou ld  r e f l e c t  both  
g e n e r a l  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t s  o f  
p o l l u t i o n  on t h e  p o p u l a t i o n , t h e  we igh t s  on bo th  be ing  h i q h l y  
a r b i t r a r y .  Though e s s e n t i a l l y  d e s c r i p t i v e ,  t h e s e  models should  
h e l p  t h e  r e g u l a t i n g  a u t h o r i t y  s t r u c t u r e  t h e  s tand,ard  s e t t i n g  
t a s k ,  i n c l u d i n g  such  problems as whether  and what r e s e a r c h  
program t o  s t a r t ,  e .g.  on h e a l t h  e f f e c t s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  reduce  
c r u c i a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  F u r t h ~ r m o r e  t hey  a l l o w  one t o  look a t  
c a s e s  where t e c h n i c a l  o r  p h y s i c a l  pa ramete r s  dominate such t h a t  
f o r  a l l  r e a s o n a b l e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  and e x i s t i n g  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
n e a r l y  t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t s  a r e  ob t a ined .  
The models c o n c e n t r a t e  on long-term a s p e c t s  cr dynamic 
problems and r a t h e r  n e g l e c t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and b a r g a i n i n g  problems 
(see, e . g . ,  O rgan i za t i on  f o r  Economic Co-operat ion and Develop- 
ment,  1976, and J.C. Harsany i ,  1977) a l though  t h e s e  can be  
i n c l u d e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e .  
The pape r  i s  o rgan i zed  as f o l l ows .  F i r s t  t h e  model d e s c r i p -  
t i o n  i s  given .  Then t h e  r ange  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  is  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by c a s e s  such  a s  North Sea o i l ,  su lphu r  d i o x i d e ,  ca rbon  d i o x i d e ,  
and n o i s e .  The North Sea  o i l  problem was t r e a t e d  as a  d e t a i l e d  
one-s tage  game model,  and m u l t i s t a g e  models w e r e  developed f o r  
carbon d i o x i d e  and n o i s e  (D. v. W i n t e r f e l d t ,  1978 ) ,  (E .  HGpfinger, 
D. v .  W i n t e r f e l d t ,  1978) .  The m u l t i s t a g e  c a s e s  a r e  ske t ched  
t h e r e a f t e r .  
S i n c e  t h e r e  is  a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n  concep t s  f o r  
n-person games ( n  > 2 ) ,  any game- theore t i c  a n a l y s i s  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  a s o l u t i o n  concep t .  Tha t  i s  why a  c l a s s  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  
s o l u t i o n  concep t s  a r e  d i s cus sed :  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  f o r  
noncoopera t ive  games, Pare to -op t imal  p o i n t s  f o r  e s s e n t i a l l y  
c o o p e r a t i v e  games, t h e  "minimal d i s t a n c e  from b l i s s - p o i n t "  
concep t ,  and t h e  Nash s o l u t i o n .  Furthermore a  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
s o l u t i o n  concept  is  g i v e n  f o r  c a s e s  where f i r s t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  
announces h i s  s t r a t e g y  and t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  p roducer .  T h i s  two- 
l e v e l  l e a d e r s h i p  concep t  may be  regarded  a s  normat ive .  
A t  t h e  end a  b r i e f  su rvey  is g iven  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  
two m u l t i s t a g e  c a s e s  demons t ra t ing  t h e  r e l evance  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
concep t s .  
MODEL DESCXIPTION 
The dynarnic o r  m u l t i s t a g e  models developed below a r e  three- 
person. games in e x t e n s i v e  form. The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  such games 
i s  r a t h e r  invo lved  and,  s i n c e  t h e  a u t h o r s  hope t h a t  t h e  fo l lowing  
d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s e l f - con t a ined  f o r  a  g e n e r a l  d e f i n -  
i t i o n  o f  games i n  e x t e n s i v e  form, t hey  on ly  r e f e r  t o  ( J . C . C .  
McKinsey, 1952) and ( G .  Owen, 1 9 6 8 ) .  
The Time-Discrete Game 
~t i s  assumed t h a t  o n l y  t i m e  p e r i o d s  o r  s t a g e s  have  t o  b e  
cons ide r ed  i n s t e a d  o f  a t iye-continuum. Thus a game is  played  
a t  each  s t a g e ,  and t h e  p l a y e r ' s  s t r a t e g i e s  c o n t r o l  n o t  o n l y  t h e  
payoff  b u t  a l s o  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  governing t h e  game 
t o  be p layed  a t  t h e  n e x t  s t a g e .  Each component game i s  d e t e r -  
mined by t h e  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  p l ay .  For exainple s can  c o n t a i n  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  p h y s i c a l  s t a t e  of  t h e  world,  e . g . ,  t h e  amount of  
o i l  i n  t h e  wa t e r ,  o f  s u l p h u r  d i o x i d e  i n  t h e  a i r ,  and t h e i r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ;  o r  t h e  r e l e v a n t  economic s t a t e .  Other  t h a n  w i th  
t h e  more u s u a l  games where p l a y e r s  make s imul taneous  and inde-  
pendent  c h o i c e s ,  p e r f e c t  information i s  assumed f o r  t h e  component 
game by t h e  fo l l owing  s t r u c t u r e :  A t  each s t a g e  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  
makes h i s  cho i ce  f i r s t ,  +hen t h e  producer  i s  informed abou t  t h e  
r e g u l a t o r ' s  c h o i c e  and makes h i s  cho i ce ,  and f i n a l l y  t h e  impactee  
l e a r n s  about  t h e  o t h e r  c h o i c e s  and makes h i s  cho ice .  
The p l a y  p roceeds  from component game t o  component game w i th  
t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  j o i n t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  p l a y e r s .  
S ince  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  o f t e n  n o t  e x a c t l y  known, 
s u b j e c t i v e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  . admi t t ed  f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s  
which may d i f f e r  from each  o t h e r .  The p roce s s  of t h e  p l a y  can 
be  s ke t ched  a s  i n  F i g u r e  1 .  
L e t  S deno t e  t h e  set o f  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e s .  For each s E S 
t h e  set  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  c h o i c e s  o r  measures is  denoted by M R ( s ) .  
Let  M, (stin,) denote  t h e  set o f  p r o d u c e r ' s  measures  o r  c h o i c e s  
I L\ 
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s t a t e  s a n d  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  c h o i c e  m R ' I f  t h e  
i 
s t a g e  i, s t a t e  s s t a g e  i + 1 ,  s t a t e  s i+ 1 
F i g u r e  1 .  T r a n s i t i o n  from s t a g e  i t o  s t a g e  i + l .  
i producer  chooses  mp E M p ( s , m R ) ,  t h e n  I L ( S  , n R I m p )  d e n o t e s  t h e  
1 
se t  o f  c h o i c e s  o r  measures p o s s i b l e  f ~ r  t h e impactee .  Hence M R 
i s  a map o n  S;  Mp a map on { ( S , ~ ~ ) ~ S E S ~ ~ ~ E M ~ ( S ) ~ :  and MI a map 
on ~ ( s I m R I m p ) ) ~ ~ ~ , m R ~ ~ R i ~ ) ~ m p ~ ~ ( ~ I m R ) ; .  Then P . ( . ~ s I m R , m p I m I )  3 
( j = R , P , I j  d e n o t e s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  n e x t  s t a t e  
g i v e n  s t a t e  s and c h o i c e s  n R I m p f m I .  S t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g  
s p a c e  ( S , a ) ,  where a is  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  o -a lgebra  t h a t  depends 
o n l y  on t h e  l a s t  s t a t e  and c h o i c e s  n e g l e c t i n g  a l l  p r e v i o u s  s ta tes  
and c h o i c e s .  For  each component game a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  
g i v e n  f o r  each  p l a y e r :  
m ) 1 s ~ S ~ m ~ ~ i * I ~ ( s )  , % E M ~ ( s ~ ~ ~ )  , m I ~ M I ( s I m R t m p ) } + ~  . : {(s ,mRfmpI  I 
2 
where U. ( s i r n R , m p , m I )  d e n o t e s  t h e  payof f  t o  p l a y e r  j ( ~ = R , P , I ) .  
3 
G a m e s  which may s t o p  a f t e r  f i n i t e l y  many s t a g e s  c a n  b e  i n -  
c l u d e d  such  t h a t  a permanent s t a t e  is  reached  p r o v i d i n ~  o n l y  one  
c h o i c e  f o r  each p l a y e r  and z e r o  payof f  f o r  each.  T h i s  is impor- 
t a n t  i n  c a s e  one  t r i e s  t o  approximate  i n f i n i t e  s t a g e  games by 
f i n i t e  s t a g e  games. 
A p l a y  o f  t h e  game i s  given  by a n  i n f i n i t e  sequence  
- - 
1 1 1 1  2 2 2 2  
(S , m  m ,m s ,mR,mp,mI ;  R' P I '  . . .)  o f  s ta tes  and d e c i s i o n s .  Then 
one p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  payoff  f u n c t i o n s  i s  g i v e n  by 
where 0 < p < 1  i s  a  discount f a c t o r  f o r  p l a y e r  j. A second j - 
one i s  g i v e n  by 
1  n  i i i  l i m  U .  (s  , m R . m p , m ~ )  . 
n-fm i = l  1 
S i n c e  t h e  l a t t e r  s u p p r e s s e s  t h e  payoff  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s  w e  
s h a l l  o n l y  u s e  t h e  f i r s t .  The d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r  p i s  t h e  l a r g e r  j 
t h e  more t h e  f u t u r e  i s  regarded  as impor t an t .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  
U .  ( r )  i s  well  d e f i n e d  i f  pi < 1.  For  s p e c i a l  cases, however, 
-1 J J 
U . ( r )  i s  w e l l  d e f i n e d  f o r  p = I because  t e c h n i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
-I j 
such a s  l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  o f  f u e l  l i m i t  t h e  summation 
I n  o r d e r  t o  a r r i v e  a t  games t h a t  are n o t  t o o  compl ica ted  
on ly  s t a t i o n a r y  s t r a t e g i e s  have been cons ide r ed .  Thus a 
s t r a t e g y  aR o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  S p rov id ing  
always t h e  same cho i ce  u R ( s ) ~ M R ( s )  as soon a s  SES o c c u r s ;  a  s t r a t e g y  
'P of t h e  producer  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  on (s ,mR) 1 seS,mR~MR(s)  1 pro- 
v i d i n g  always t h e  same c h o i c e  a p ( s  ,mR) €Ifp (s  ,m ) as soon as R 
( s , m R )  o c c u r s ;  and ana logous ly  t h e  i m p a c t e e ' s  s t r a t e g y  a  is  I 
a  f u n c t i o n  on 
such t h a t  
Given a  s t r a t e g y  t .uple  ( a  R ~ ' P ~ ' I  ) I  a  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  P . ( . I O ~ , L T ~ , O ~ )  ove r  t h e  space  of  p o s s i b l e  p l a y s  i s  de te rmined  3 
f o r  each p l a y e r .  Under m e a s u r a b i l i t y  condi t i o n s  n o t  s p e c i f i e d  
each  p l a y e r  c an  e x p e c t  a  payoff  g iven  by 
wkcre U. ( I T  j d e n o t e s  t h e  payoff  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  p i a y  T. 
-3 
Except  f o r  a  s o l u t i o n  concep t  and e x c e p t  f o r  a  ma themat ica l  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  assumpt ions  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  we l l -behav io r  
o f  t h e  mathemat ica l  t e r m s  3bove, t h e  model d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  
m,-, - . - ap le te .  
So f a r  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a f f e c t e d  by p o l l u t i o n  h a s  been r e p r e s e n t e d  
3s a r a t i o n a l  p l a y e r  w i t h  a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  T h i s  i s  no s e l f -  
.T-,;l>iznt approach.  Another  p o s s i b i l i t y  would be  t o  r e p r e s e n t  
;he p o p u l a t i o n  by a  response  f u n c t i o v  based on i t s  ~ e r c e p t i o n  
of t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p o l l u t i o n .  But t h i s  can  be done w i t h i n  t h e  
ga1 .e - theore t i c  model g i v e n  above i n  t h a t  t h e  c h o i c e  sets 
M I ( s P m  ,m ) c o n t a i n  one e lement  o n l y .  I f  t h e  i m p a c t e e ' s  payoff  R P 
i s  n o t  of i n t e r e s t  one  can d r o p  t h e  impactee  and o n l y  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  r e g u l a t o r  and p roducer .  However, 
it i s  n o t  e a s y  i n  g e n e r a l  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a  r e sponse  f u n c t i o n  ade-  
q u a t e l y  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r e a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i n n .  One r e s u l t  
oS a t h r e e - p e r s o n  g m e - t h e o r e t i c  model ma~7 t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i s t  i n  
r e s p o n s e  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  s p e c l a l  s t r a t e g i e s  of  t h e  impac tee  
and a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  w i t h  some s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  game. 
J u r i d i c a l  p r o c e d u r e s  can be  f o r m a l i z e d  w i t h i n  t h i s  frame- 
11713rk a t  l e a s t  by r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  c o u r t  s e n t e n c e  a s  a  t r a n s i t i o n  
from one s t a t e  i n t o  a n o t h e r .  Research programs on h e a l t h  e f f e c t s  
and t h e  i r n p a c t e ~ l s  a t t i t u d e  can  reduce  t h e  range  of MI and make 
t h e  t r a n s i t i m  law more e x a c t ,  r e d u c i n g ,  f o r  example, t h e  v a r i a n c e  
of a d i s t x - i h u t i o n  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n .  
E x t e n s i o n s  
I f  t h s  ~ z m z  has o n l y  f i n i t e l y  many s t a g e s  and t h e  sets o f  
<;czites and measures of a l l  t h e  p l a y e r s  a r e  f i n i t e ,  t h e  game 
always h a s  zn e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  i n  " p u r e "  ( n o n s t a t i o n a r y )  s t r a -  
t e g i e s  ( s e c ,  f o r  example, J.  Rosenrnuller,  1 9 7 7 )  , i. e. no random 
c h o i c e s  are  n e c e s s a r y .  T h i s  i s  due  t o  t h e  p r o p z r t y  o f  f u l l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  a l l  p l a y e r s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  one may a s k  whether  
o t h e r  o r d e r s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  among t h e  p l a y e r s '  c h o i c e s  a r e  
a p p r o p r i a t e .  F i r s t l y ,  t h i s  approach seems a  s u i t a b l e  one  s i n c e  
t h e  r e g u l a t o r  i s  o f t e n  r e q a r d e d  a s  t h e  most power fu l  p l a y e r  who 
u s u a l l y  i s  t h e  f i r s t  anmuncing h i s  c h o i c e s .  C i t i z e n  g r o u p s  
~ l s u a l l y  o n l y  r e a c t  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  o r  p r o d u c e r ' s  d e c i s i o n .  
Secondly ,  a ?  3 l t e r n a t i v e  o r d e r  of  s u c c e s s i o n  can  be  i n c l u d e d  
by i n t r o d u c i n g  dummy c h o i c e s  and e n l a r q i n g  t h e  s t a t e  s p a c e  by 
t h e  p l a y e r s s  l a s t  c h o i c e s .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  might  y i e l d  a  
cumbersome z c d e l  . 
One ar:Lves at ~TIUCI? n o r e  compl ica ted  games i f  one  c o n s i d e r s  
s t r a t e g i e s  l i k e  ' k e d u c t i o n  by 20 p e r c e n t  o f  emiss ion  o f  a  p o l -  
l u t a n t  o v e r  f i v e  y e a r s "  i f  t h e r e  i s  no major  ch2nge o f  economic 
o r  t e c h n i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  Due t o  a  l a c k  o f  t i m e  such a  model h a s  
n o t  been developed.  Due t o  t h e s t a t i o n a r y  p r o p e r t y  o f  s t r a t e g i e s ,  
however, t h i s  model can i n c r e a s e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  emiss ion 
r educ t i on  by 2 0  percen t  ove r  f i v e  y e a r s  t h u s  r e f l e c t i n g  a  
"mixed" s t r a t e g y .  
Barga in ing  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  can b e  inc luded  ( J . C .  Harsanyi ,  
1977) .  Bargaining among t h e  groups t h a t  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  
t h r e e  p l a y e r s  i s  n o t  a  major p o i n t  o f  t h e  game-theoret ic  model. 
I n s t e a d  w e  r a t h e r  s t a r t  from t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  g roups  
have reached. agreements.  Thus, f o r  example, an a n a l y s i s  l i k e  
t h e  one o f  (W.  R i c h t e r ,  1978) o f  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  a  p u b l i c  u t i l i t y  
ha s  n o t  been c a r r i e d  over  t o  d e t r i m e n t a l  f a c i l i t i e s  l i k e  n u c l e a r  
p l a n t s  u s i n g  coope ra t i ve  game theo ry  where t h e  p l a y e r s  are t h e  
a f f e c t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s .  I n  t h e  case of  g l o b a l  p o l l u t i o n  and l o c a l  
r e g u l a t o r s ,  p roducers ,  and c i t i z e n  g roups ,  however, t h e  1-ocal 
models a r e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  modeling t h e  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n  among 
t h e  groups  o f  r e g u l a t o r s .  
RANGE OF APPLICATIOYS 
The fo l l owing  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  cases s e r v e s  a s  an  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
i n t o  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  problems t h a t  can be  t r e a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
framework o u t l i n e d  above. 
North Sea O i l  
Due t o  o i l  haulage  i n  t h e  North Sea t h e r e  i s  now, even 
dur ing  normal o p e r a t i o n ,  p o l l u t i o n  by ch ron i c  o i l  d i s c h a r g e s  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  a c c i d e n t a l  o i l  s p i l l s .  
components o f  s t a t e :  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o l l u t i n g  c i l  i n  t h e  
North Sea,  amount of  o i l  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  p rev ious  y e a r ,  amount 
o f  f i s h  caught  i n  t h e  l a s t  p rev ious  y e a r ,  r e c r e a t i o n  index  of  
t h e  c o a s t ,  equipment and o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  t h e  t h r e e  p l a y e r s .  
Choices: 
a )  Regula tor :  maximal amount o f  o i l  p o l l u t i o n ,  moni- 
t o r i n g  systems t o g e t h e r  w i t h  b a s i c  j u r i d i c a l  measures ( t a x e s ) ,  
r e s e a r c h  programs on e f f e c t s  of  p o l l u t i o n ;  
b )  Producer: amount o f  o i l  t o  b e  r a i s e d  du r ing  t h e  
nex t  p e r i o d ,  t r e a t m e n t ,  equipment, v i o l a t i o n  o f  s t a n d a r d ;  
c )  Impactee: no a c t i o n ,  agg re s s ion  a g a i n s t  o i l  
company, changes of p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  f ishermen drop  t h e i r  
jobs ,  t o u r i s t s  avo id  c o a s t s .  
Conseqaences,  c o s t s ,  and b e n e f i t s :  s a t i s f i c a t i o n  o f  s t a n -  
d a r d s  o f  o t h e r  n a t i o n s ,  i n c r e a s e  o f  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p roduc t ,  
b e t t e r  balance-of-payments,  d e c r e a s e d  wate r  q u a l i t y ,  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  f i s h i n g  and tour i sm.  
Sulphur  Dioxide 
R e g i o ~ . a l  p o l l u t i o n  by burn ing  f o s s i l  f u e l .  
Cornpor2nts of s t a t e :  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s u l p h u r  d i o x i d e  i n  
t h e  a i r ,  number o f  i l l s  e f f e c t e d  by s u l p h u r  d i o x i d e ,  amount 
o f  su l ?h u r  d i o x i d e  produced i n  the -  p r ev ious  y e a r ,  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o ~ .  o f  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a t t r a c t i v i t y  f a c t o r  o f  l andscape ,  
percec::age o f  unemployed, g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  ... 
Choices :  
3.1 Regula to r :  maximal amount o f  e m i t t e d  S O  ( i n c l u d -  
i n g  j r r i d i c a l  b a s i s )  , ( t a x e s )  , moni to r i ng ,  remova? o f  p ro -  
d u c e r s ,  i n i t i a t e  r e s e a r c h  program on h e a l t h  e f f e c t s ,  
in2rovement o f  medica l  sys tems ,  h e l p  f o r  m i g r a t i o n  o f  
~ 3 p u l ~ : ~ i o r l ~  . . . ; 
2; Energy producer :  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  f i l t e r s ,  reduc- 
t i o n  :_ i energy  p r o d uc t i on ,  combustion o f  o t h e r  f u e l s ;  
cj Impactee: m i g r a t i o n ,  a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t  government 
o r  energy p r o d u ce r ,  c i v i l  a c t i o n ,  v o t e  t o  suspend government, 
r e du c i n g  h i s  sxn cons.c~xption o f  energy.  
Conseq-lences , c o s t s ,  and b e n e f i t s  : employ~nent , l a r g e  g r o s s  
n a t i o y  nrnd--c. t  ,,, ,, lung d i s e a s e s ,  u l t i n a t e l y  d e a t h .  
Carbon Dioxide 
Globa l  p o l l u t i o n  m an i f e s t ed  as i n c r e a s e d  amount o f  carbon 
d i o x i d e  i n  .the atmosphere.  
Compor-znts o f  s t a t e :  amount of  a tmospher ic  C 0 2 ,  t empera tu re ,  
h i g h  t em p e r a t u r e  c a t a s t r o p h e .  
Choices:  
a )  Regula to r :  maximal amount ~f e ~ i t t e d  C 0 2  ( i n c l u d i n g  
j u r i d i c a l  b a s i s ) ;  
b) Producer :  amount of p roduc t i on  o f  C 0 2 ;  
c )  Impactee: a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t  energy producer  o r  
government,  v c t e  t o  suspend government,  reduce  energy 
c o n ~ ~ p t i o n .  
Consequences, c o s t s ,  and b e n e f i t s :  employment, l a r g e  g r o s s  
n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t s ,  c a t a s t r o p h e .  
Noise 
A l o t  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  impose a  n o i s e  problem on 
t h e i r  e ~ v i r o n m e n t .  Th i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  f a s t  
Shinkhansen t r a i n  i n  Japan.  
Components o f  s t a t e :  maximum q u a n t i t y  of  n o i s e  n e a r  t h e  
r a i l way  l i n e ,  s e t t l e m e n t  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t h e  r a i lway  
l i n e ,  l a y o u t  o f  soundwal ls ,  upper  bound f o r  speed o f  
t r a i n s .  
Choices:  
a )  Regula tor :  maximal q u a n t i t y  o f  speed o r  n o i s e ,  
o r d e r  t o  b u i l d  sound w a l l s ;  
b) Producer  (o f  n o i s e ) :  s ~ u n d  w a l l s ,  reduced speed,  
d i s l o c a t i o n  of  ne ighbors  ; 
c )  Impactee: compla in t s ,  p e t i t i o n  t o  r e g u l a t o r ,  
l e g a l  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  r a i lway  company. 
Consequences, c o s t s ,  and b e n e f i t s :  i n c r e a s e d  o r  dec r ea sed  
g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  d i s l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s i d e n t s ,  h e a l t h  
e f f e c t s  on r e s i d e n t s .  
EXAMPLES 
The North Sea O i l  problem a s  y e t  h a s  on ly  been t r e a t e d  a s  
a  d e t a i l e d  one-stage model by D. v.  Win t e r f e ld ,  (1 978, 2) . The 
s t u d y  c o n t a i n s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  hand le  
w i t h i n  a  genuine  m u l t i s t a g e  model and i s  n o t  d i s c u s s e d  h e r e  
f u r t h e r .  I t  h a s  t u r n ed  o u t  t h a t  t h e  s u l p h u r  d i o x i d e  problem 
can o n l y  b e  t r e a t e d  ad eq u a t e ly  w i t h i n  a  r e g i o n a l  model i n c l u d i n g  
s e v e r a l  p o l l u - t o r s ,  input-outpu-c a n a l y s i s ,  and m i q r a t i o n  problems. 
Cons ider ing  t h e  l a ck  o f  s o l u t i o n s  and i n  t h e  unders tand ing  o f  t h e  
b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  s i m p l e r  c a s e s ,  t h i s  problem h a s  been pos t -  
poned. I n  t h e  s h o r t  p e r i o d  o f  t ime  a v a i l a b l e  o n l y  s t u d i e s  on 
ca rbon  d i o x i d e  and n o i s e  a s  dynamic games w e r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  t h a t  
a r e  briefly o u t l i n e d  i n  t h i s  paper .  D e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n s  can 
be  found i n  ( E .  Hopfinger ,  1978, 1 )  and (E. Hopffnger ,  D.  
v.  i d i n t e r f e l d t ,  1978) .  
A M u l t i s t a g e  Model f o r  t h e  Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Problem 
- 
The e f f e c t s  of i n c r e a s e d  s h a r e s  o f  carbon d i o x i d e  i n  t h e  
atmosphere a r e  n o t  w e l l  known. The c o n j e c t u r e s  t h a t - e x i s t  a t  
p r e s e n t  a r e  r a t h e r  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  T h i s  model i s  based on t h e  
assumption t h a t  a  con t inuous  i n c r e a s e  o f  C 0 2  i n  t h e  atmosphere 
beyond an  unknown c r i t i c a l  v a l u e ,  caused by t h e  burn inu  of  
f o s s i l  f u e l ,  w i l l  l e a d  t o  i r r e v e r s i b l e  and l a r g e  changes i n  
t h e  c l i m a t e  o f  t h e  e a r t h  t h a t  a r e  t o  be regarded  a s  c a t a s t r o p h i c .  
The r e g u l a t o r  i s  assumed t o  be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agency,  and t h e  
g roup  o f  a l l  emitters of  C 0 2  as t h e  producer .  
The s t a t e s  of t h e  game a r e  
where 
C is t h e  amount o f  carbon d i o x l d e  I n  t h e  atmosphere; 
L i s  t h e  upper bound o f  emiss ion  o f  C 0 2  dur ing  t h e  pe r iod ;  
k  i s  t h e  c r i t i c a l  va lue  of t h e  z tmospher ic  C02-content.  
S i n c e  t h e  t r u e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e  i s  unknown one h a s  t o  con- 
s i d e r  t h e  set  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s .  
1 Le t  (c' ,L ) deno te  t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e .  The c h o i c e s  o f  t h e  
p l a y e r s  i n  c a s e  o f  s t a t e  (C,L) a r e  t h e  fo l lowing :  
The r e g u l a t o r  chooscs  0 < 1 < L,  w i t h  1 deno t ing  t h e  unper 
bound of  carbon d i o x i d e  emi t t ed  by t h e  producer .  The producer  
chooses  0 - < a  - < 1, t h e  amount o f  C 0 2  t o  b e  emi t t ed .  The producer  
chooses  t h e  deg ree  of  p r e s s u r e  0 < p < 1 he wants t o  e x e r t  on 
t h e  r e g u l a t o r .  With p r o b a b i l i t y  pv tEe bound L i s  r e p l a c e d  by 
- 
L 2t  where 0  < v < 1 i s  a  f i x e d  number. 
For  s t a t e  k  t h e  cho i ce s  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  - a r e  1 = 0 ,  a  = 0, 
p = 0. 
By assumpt ion t h e  c r i t i c a l  va lue  i s  n o t  known and f u r t h e r  
i n fo rma t ion  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  Hence a l l  t h r e e  p l a y e r s  may have 
d i f f e r e n t  c o n j e c t u r e s  denoted by CI,  Cp ,  and CR. For s i m ~ l i c i t y  
Cp deno te s  t h e  maximal amount o f  carbon d i o x i d e  i n  t h e  atmosphere 
i f  a l l  f o s s i l  f u e l  i s  b u r n t .  
Given c t a t e  (C,L) an2  t h e  c h o i c e s  (1 , a . p )  t h e  fo l lowing  
s t a t e s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  a t  t h e  nex t  s t age :  
(C+Ba,L), L (C+flaI7) , i k X 1  - . 
w i t h  Ra deno t ing  t h a t  p a r t  of t h e  carbon d i o x i d e  e m i t t e d  remains 
i n  t h e  a i r .  R i s  assumed t o  be c o n s t a n t .  The s u b j e c t i v e  proba- 
b i l i t i e s  PR,Pp.PI f o r  t h e  new s t a t e s  a r e :  
S t a t e  'k c a n n o t  be changed. 
T15e t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  s t a t e  s t o  s t a t e  t has t h e  u t i l i t y  
-- t , ( s ; l , a , p , ; t )  f o r  player  j = R , P , I .  
: L  U! ( C , L ;  l , a , p ; C + R a , M )  = cl  l + c , a + c 3 p  (M=L,?) 
J L. 
U i ( C , L : l , a , p : k )  = c, l+c ,,+c k-C n + c  2 8  3.. R 
U ~ , i k ; o , o , o ; k )  = 0 
U,i :C,L;  l , a , p ; C + R a , M )  = c4a ( K = L t 7 )  L  
- k-C W ( C , L ; l , a , p ; k )  I. 
= ' 4 7 -  + C~ 
U 2  ( k ; o , o , o : k )  = 0 3 
i ? . ; ( C , L ; l , a , p ; C + R a , M )  = c 5 a + c  D L  
- 6- (M=Ltq)  
i J J ( C , L ; l , a , p ; k )  - . cgT k - c  + c 6 p + c  
I I 
r -  l d- i k ; o , o , o ; k )  = 0 
- 
0 i f  C<CI<C+Ra - 
I -pv i f  C+f3a<CI - 
0 i f  C<CI<C+Ba - 
pv i f  C+Ra<CI - 
I i f  C<CI<C+Ba - 
B e c a ~ ~ s  of U .  ( s , l , a , p )  = /u! ( s , l . a . p , t ) d P .  ( t ( s , l , a , p )  (j = R , P , I )  r 3 3 3 
i . e .  U, i s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  expectsd u t i l i t y  of t h e  u t i l i t y  of t h e  
- 
p a y o f f  :: 
P~ 
I - p v  
pv 
New S t a t e  
( C + R a , L )  




sFace ':he c o n d i t i o n a l  probab i l i ty  P . ( k  1 k , o , o  , o )  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  3 
f r o m  s.:ate k t o  s t a t e  k  occurs i s  one. 
P~ 
0 i f  C<CR<C+Ra - 
1 - p v  i f  C+Ra<CR - 
0 i f  C<CR<C+Ra 
- 
pv i f  C+Ra<CR - 
1  i f  C<CR<C+Ra - 
The paramete rs  a r e  assumed t o  have t h e  fo l l owing  s i g n s  cl,o, 
c 2 > o ,  c3<o ,  c 4 > o ,  c5>0, c 6 > o  whereas cR, cp, cI a r e  l a r g e  
n e g a t i v e  payo f f s .  c l ~ O  r e f l e c t s  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  i n t e r ~ a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  t o  s e t  sma l l  s t a n d a r d s ,  c2>or c 4 > o ,  c5>o  t h e  
b e n e f i t s  o f  exergy p roduc t i on ,  c3<o  t h e  damage of  p r e s s u r e ,  
and c6<o  t h e  burden o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e s e  
assumpt ions  a l r e a d y  de te rmine  t h e  shape o f  t h e  range o f  t h e  
payo f f s .  
A M u l t i s t a g e  Model f o r  Noise Problems 
S i n c e  t h e  opening o f  t h e  f a s t  r a i lway  l i n e  Shinkansen i n  
1964, compla in t s  about  n o i s e  and v i b r a t i o n  have never  ceased .  
U p  ts czt: t h e  ZspanEse l < a i i o n a i  Railways have been r e l u c t a n t  t o  
t a k e  s t e p s  t a r a r d s  n o i s e  r e d u c t i o n  such a s  b u i l d i n g  soundwal l s ,  
d i s l o c a t i o n  o f  ne ighbo r s ,  and slowing down t r a i n s .  So f a r  t h e  
i m p a c t e e ' s  mearsures  have gone th rough  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  s t a g e s :  
compla in t s ,  p e t i t i o n  t o  t h e  government, o r g a n i z a t i o n  of c i t i z e n s  
for  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  Japanese  Na t iona l  Railways and t h e  
government, and l e g a l  p roceed ings .  The r e q u l a t o r  c o n s i s t s  o f  
v a r i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( l i k e  t h e  Environmental  Agency, f o r  e x m p l e )  
w i t h  e x ~ e r t  committees and subcommittees,  l o c a l  government, and 
n a t i o n a l  government. For a  b e t t e r  understandin: o f  t h e  b a s i c  
s t r u c t u r e , , t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l .  a s p e c t s  a r e  neg l ec t ed  and t h e  regu- 
l a t o r  i s  fo rma l i zed  a s  one p l a y e r .  The impactee i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by a  r e sponse  func t i on .  
The s t a t e s  of t h e  game a r e  a s u b s e t  of 
- 
where L deno te s  an  upper bound f o r  an admi t t ed  n o i s e  l e v e l ,  n  
t h e  maximum v a l u e  of n o i s e  produced by t h e  t r a i n  o p e r a t e d  on ly  
under  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and n>O t h e  minimum v a l u e  of  n o i s e  
under  which t h e  t r a i n  can be  run  unaer  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
(L ,1 )  i s  t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e  a f t e r  cons tn l c t j . on  o f  t h e  ra i lway  l i n e .  
Hence ( L , 1 )  = ( E l l ) .  S t a t e  ( L 1 2 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a  ~ e t i t i o n  has  
been f i l e d .  (L13)  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  popula t ion  a f f e c t e d  by no i se  
has  orgznized i t s e l f  t o  n e g o t i a t e  with t h e  government f o r  a low 
noise  s tandard .  I f  n e g o t i a t i o n s  f a i l  t h e  impactee can  s t a r t  a  
l a w s u i t ,  which i s  i n d i c a t e d  by ( L , 4 ) .  (L,4)  can be followed by 
s t a t e s  of typ?  ( L ,  5 ) ,  ( L ,  6 ) ,  o r  (L ,? )  . ( L ,  5 )  denotes  t h a t  a 
permanent compromise h a s  been achieved wi th  upper bound L  f o r  
noise:  (L16)  t h a t  t h e  l awsu i t  ::as 5ecided i n  a  n e u t r a l  o r  posi -  
t i v e  way f o r  t h e  Japanese  Nat iona l  Railways and t h e  government; 
and (L ,7)  t h a t  t h e  l awsu i t  was decided i n  f avo r  of t h e  impactee. 
( L 1 5 ) ,  ( L , 6 ) ,  2nd (L ,7)  a r e  f i n a l  o r  absorb ing  s t a t e s .  
For each c l a s s  of s t a t e s  t h e  component game and t h e  t r a n s -  
i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y  a r e  g iven  sepa ra t e ly .  
It i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  of  t h e  t r a i n  have 
aggregated such t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  of t h e  r e g u l a t o r  is  g iven  as a  
func t ion  oz t h c  va lues  of no ise :  
- 
u , :  [n ,n]  -. a 
a s  long a s  t h e r e  i s  no a c t i o n  on p a r t  of t h e  populat ion.  R is  
assumed t o  be unimodal, i . e .  it i s  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  on [ n , ~ + ]  - 
+ 
and s t r i c t l y  dec reas ing  on [L',;] where L E [n,:]. - u r e f l e c t s  R 
a  compromise among t h e  econonic importance of t h e  t r a i n  and t h e  
d e t r i m e n t a l  e f f e c t  on t h e  neighboring r e s i d e n t s .  A s  long a s  t h e r e  
i s  no r e g u l a t i o n  t h e  (no i se - )  p roducer ' s  u t i l i t y  is  s p e c i f i e d  
by t h e  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  func t ion  
based completely on economic cons ide ra t ions .  
In  t h e  ca se  of the f i r s t  s t a t e  (L, 1)  = (6 , l  j t h e  s e t s  of ' 
choices  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
where 1 denotes  t h e  utmost l e v e l  of no i se  allowed t o  t h e  producer,  
and n  t h e  va lue  of n o i s e  genera ted  by ra i lway opera t ion .  The 
impacteels  cho ices  a r e  no t  s p e c i f i e d  s i n c e  t h e  impactee i s  f o r -  
malized by a  response func t ion  r e s u l t i n g  i n  s p e c i a l  t r a n s i t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  
Given s t a t e  ( < , l )  only s t a t e s  - ( n , l )  and ( n , 2 )  can succeed. 
A c r i t i c a l  n o i s e  l e v e l  n ~ ~ [ g , n I  is  assumed f o r  t h e  impactee such 
t h a t  n c i s e  i s  regarded a s  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  impact i f  and only i f  
i t s  value  i s  g r e a t e r  than  n _ .  The s u b j e c t i v e  t r a n s i t i o n  proba- 
1 b i l i t i e s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
I n d i c e s  j = R I P  f o r  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  a r e  o m i t t e d  
s i n c e  t h i s  model assumes t h a t  r e g u l a t o r  and p roducer  c o n s u l t  
t h e  same e x p e r t s .  p 2 > 0  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e x p e r t s  s u b j e c t i v e  proba- 
b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  impac tee  w i l l  p r e f e r  a p e t i t i o n .  The u t i l i t i e s  
a r e  g i v en  by 
Given s t a t e  (:,2) t h e  s e t  o f  measures a r e  
Then ( E l  2 )  c an  o n l y  be  r e p l a c e d  by ( E l  3)  d e n o t i n g  t h e  
fo rmat ion  o f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n .  W e  assume, , the  fo l l owing  sub- 
j s c t i v e  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s :  
where p3>0.  The i d e a  i s  t h a t  n<nI  - i s  conceivnd a s  g i v i n g  i n  by 
e i t h c r  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  by l < n I  - o r  by t h e  p roducer  i n  t h e  case o f  
n<n <1. The p a y o f f s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
- I 
I f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  formed (which i s  denoted by n , 3 )  it 
i s  t h e  i m p a c t e e ' s  o b j e c t i v e  t o  have t h e  r e g u l a t o r  g i v e  i n .  
L e t  
- 
~ ~ ( i i ' 3 )  := i l J n  - 5 1 2 n l  ; 
t h e n  
where p4>0  and ( & 4 )  deno tes  t h e  s ta r t  of  a l zwsu i t .  L e t  
- 
U .  ( n , 3 , 1 1 n )  := u .  ( n )  (j = RIP; 2 5 n  < n )  
3 3 -
Three outcomes o f  a  l z w s u i t  a r e  considered.  There  i s  a  
compromise (L15) suspending t h e  l a w s u i t ,  cr  a  een tence  i n  f avo r  
of  r e g u l a t o r  and producer  ( L , 6 ) ,  o r  2 s e c t e n c e  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  
impactee (L17) .  L e t  
Le t  
M~ := l l A ; m p  I ( 1 . A )  E 4 , A<nII mp E M p ) i i 1 4 1 1 )  1 
u t ( m R ; n , ~ )  1 mR E ~ ~ ( i i , 4 ) .  (n,N) E Mp(iir41mR) , N<n1) 
be c a l l e d  t h e  set compromise p a i r s  o f  cho i ce s .  Then w e  assume 
( 1  i f  ( m R l m p )  E MC and L = min ( A 1 N ) .  
where A := +m o r  N := +m u n l e s s  P ( ( L t 5 ) 1 n f 4 , m R ~ m p , ) =  d e f i n e d p r e v i o u s l y ;  
\ 0 e l s e ;  
I p7 i f  L = nI and ( m R t m p )  MC: P (  (L.7)  / ~ 1 4 ~ m ~ 1 m ~ )  = 0 else ;  
P (  ( ~ ~ 6 )  ) ~ , 4 , m R I m p )  = 
p 6  i f  L = nR and ( m R I m p )  4 M C i  
0 else; 
where 2 5 nI 5 nR 2 R f o r  t h e  maximal n o i s e  l e v e l  nR f i x e d  by 
t h e  c o u r t  is  i n  f a v o r  o f  t h e  p roducer ,  Ozp +p <1. Hence 6 7- 
The p a y o f f s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
S t a t e  (L15) means t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  . r e g u l a t o r  ha s  agreed  t o  t a k e  
LznI a s  t h e  maximal n o i s e  l e v e l  o r  t h a t  t h e  producer  h a s  bound 
h imse l f  t o  n o i s e  l e v e l s  n o t  h i g h e r  t h a n  L<n 
- I '  
Let  
MR(L.5) := { l l z  5 1 - < L} I 
Mp(L.5) := I n l n  5 n  - < 1 )  , 
t h e n  
P((L,5) ( ~ , 5 , l , n )  = 1 .  
The p a y o f f s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  by 
S t a t e  ( nR ,6 )  i n d i c a t e s  a  s en t ence  un favo rab l e  t o  t h e  
impactee .  
L e t  
S t a t e  ( n I f 7 )  s i g n i f i e s  a  s en t ence  unfavorab le  t o  r e g u l a t o r  
and producer .  Le t  
Then 
The payo f f s  a r e  g iven  by 
ci 0 e x p r e s s e s  t h e  freedom of  d e c i s i o n s  l o s t  f o r  o t h e r  indus-  
J 
t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i nvo lv ing  n o i s e  s i n c e  t h e  s en t ence  must be  
t aken  i n t o  account  f o r  t h e  de s ign ing  of  such a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  
t h e  c a s e  of  L+>n1, it i s  assumed t h a t  c i s  a  n e g a t i v e  m u l t i p l e  i 
Since  (L ,  5) , (nR, 6 ) ;  and (nI ,7 )  a r e  permanent s t a t e s  t h e  
payo f f s  f c r  p idys  w i l l  only  e x i s t  f o r  p ropzr  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r s  
PR <I and p p < l -  pR and pp need n o t  be equa l .  Sometimes p < p  P R 
seems t o  be  an adequate  assessment .  
SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
Given t h e  s t r a t e g y - s e t s  C i  (j = R , P , I )  of  t h e  t h r e e  p l a y e r s  
2 
and t h e  v e c t o r  of  u t i l i t i e s  (VR,Vp,VI)  de f ined  o~ t h e  c a r t e s i a n  
product  CRxCpxCI of  t h e  s t r a t e g y  sets, each p l a y e r  f a c e s  t h e  
problem of  s e l e c t i n g  a s t r a t e g y  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a  h igh  
u t i l i t y .  F e a t u r e s  t h a t  have t o  be cons idered  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  
of a p p r o p r i a t e  s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  p r e c i s e l y  formulated a s  s o l u t i o n  
concep ts .  However, excep t  f o r  two-person zero-sum games, 
t h e r e  i s  no unique s o l u t i o n  concep t  f o r  gene ra l  n-person games 
(see R.D.  Luce, H. Rai f f a ,  1957) , ( J . C .  Harsanyi ,  1977) . 
I n  t h e  fo l lowing  w e  w i l l  i n t r o d u c e  s e v e r a l  f a m i l i a r  s o l u -  
t i o n  concep ts  and d i s c u s s  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  problem 
of p rocedures  f o r  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  which depends on t h e  
s p e c i f i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n ,  and t h e  purpose 
o f  o u r  a n a l y s i s .  
D e f i n i t i o n  
+ + +  
A t h r e e - t u p l e  ((JR,oP,OI) E zRxzpxz of s t r a t e g i e s  i s  I 
c a l l e d  a  wedk equilibrium point i f  
+ + +)  is called a s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  The three-tuple (aRt up
' 
point if the left-hand term of an inequality is always larger 
than the right-hand term. 
Discussion 
Equilibrium points are points of stability inasmuch as 
no player can improve his payoff if all the players persist 
in their equilibrium strategy. There is no statement as to 
how to arrive at an equilibrium point. In R.D. Luca, H. Raiffa, 
(1957, p. 91), it is pointed out that it is advantageous in such 
a situation to disclose one's strategy first and to have a 
reputation for inflexibility. A further complication is that 
several equilibrium points can exist. 
It can be proven that the j-th component of the equilibrium 
+ + +  + + + + + payoff vector (VR(~Rt~pt~I) tVp (aRtaptaI) t vp (uRtupta~) ) is at 
least as large as the corresponding maximum payoff which is 
defined as max inf V. (aRtapt~I) .
a a. (~E{R,P,I}~{~}) I j 1 
The following solution concept makes sense only if some collu- 
sion is possible. 
Definition 
~ e t u d  - enote the range of the utility functions: 
3 u = (x1fx2fX3) = v' (oR~op~oI) j I 
for one (aR+, apt uI) GZ~XZ~XZ~}. The payoff vector (uR,up ,uI) ELI 
is called Pare to -op t ima l  if there is no (vR,vp,vI) ~ u s u c h  that 
u.<v (j = R,P,I) 
I -  j 
and u. <v for one j at least. 
3 
Discussion 
Pareto-optimal payoff vectors are the undominated payoff 
vectors. Usually they exist in abundance. They are important 
in the case of collusion because then one can expect the players 
to use strategies yielding Pareto-optimal payoffs. 
So far no comparison of utilities has been necessary. This 
is different for the following concept. 
Definition 
+ + +  Let (uR,up,uI) denote the point of maximal possible 
payoffs called bliss point, i.e. 
+ 
u = max(u. I (uR,up,uI)~~ (j = R,P,I) . j 3 
The payoff vector (uR,up,uI) is called bliss-optimal if 
Discussion 
The bliss-optimal point depends on the norm. Here we 
have chosen the euclidean norm, but it is quite obvious that 
an 1'-norm with p* may give other results. Furthermore, if 
the utilities are changed by linear positive transformation, 
the new bliss-optimal point is only in special cases related 
to the former by the same utility transformations. 
Although R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa (1957) point out that 
the following concept is independent of positive affine trans- 
formations, this is no longer true for more general transfor- 
mations. 
Definition 
Let (dR,dp,dI) be a triple of payoffs the players obtain 
if they cannot reach an unanimous agreement or the choice of 
a payoff vector UE& Then the Nash solution is the point 
+ + +  (uR,up,uI) at which the term (UR-dR) (U -d ) (U -d ) is maximized P P I I 
subject to the requirement (uR,up,uI) E'U. u. >d (j = R,P, I) . I- j 
Discussion 
di are called conflict payoffs. It is obvious that a 
J 
Nash solution is Pareto-optimal. By definition as a product, 
- 
n 
the term i=R,P, I (Um-dj) gives the same weight to each utility, 
- 
hence the Nash solution is symmetrically dependent on the 
utilities. Sometimes d is assumed to be the maximum payoff 
of player j. j 
So f a r  co n cep t s  w i t hou t  s p e c i a l  a s sumpt ions  abou t  t h e  
announcement of s t radzegies  have been d i s c u s s e d .  The fo l l owing  
d e a l s  w i t h  a  l e a d e r s h i p  concep t  y i e l d i n g  a  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n  
concep t .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  ha s  t o  announce h i s  
s t r a t e g y  f i r s t  and t h e n  t h e  producer .  Optimal r e sponse s  on 
p a r t  of  t h e  impactee  and t h e  producer  can  be r ega rded  a s  
s o l u t i o n s .  
D e f i n i t i o n  
A hierarchic soZution i s  a  t h r e e - t u p l e  ( T ~ ,  r p I r I )  of a 
s t r a t e g y  T ~ E C ~ ,  and two maps 
T P :  C R  4 C p  , 
TI: Z R  X C p  + L I  , 
such t h a t  
U I  ( o r r a p  , r i ( a  a 1 )  = max VI(aR,ap,aI )  ; R'  P  
V R ( r R , r P  ( ' 1 ~ 1  , . T ~ ! T ~ , T ?  ( ~ ~ 1 )  = max VR(aR,-rp ( a R )  , T ~  ( o ~ , T ~  ( a R )  ) . 
a  E C  R R 
Discuss ion  
The d e f i n i t i o n  of h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n  i n d i c a t e s '  t h a t  such  
a  s o l u t i o n  i s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  a  dynamic programming problem 
over  S u n c t i o n  sp ace s .  Hence, b e s i d e s  t h e  r a t h e r  r e s t r i c t i v e  
r e q u i r e men t s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  s o l u t i o n  
(K. H i n d e r e r ,  1 9 7 0 ) ,  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of a  s o l u t i o n  can  be  
c a r r i e d  o u t  o n l y  f o r  s p e c i a l  models. However, t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  
s o l u t i o n  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  conv inc ing  i f  t h e  cor responding  p a y o f f s  
a r e  Pare to -op t imal  s i n c e  t h e n  c o l l u s i o n  canno t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
payoff  of  a l l  p l a y e r s .  Fur the rmore ,  it  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o i n t ,  a s  can  e a s i l y  b e  s een .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of  a one-s tage  
game, t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
concep t  used i n  Rv. W i n t e r f e l d t ,  (1978, 1) under t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  
s p e c i f i e d  t h e r e .  
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Whether it is worth it or not to develop a game-theoretic 
framework in any sense (e.g. normative or descriptive) for the 
conflict situation among the interest groups involved in a 
pollution problem, can only be decided on the basis of case 
studies. Actually, there is only the study on carbon dioxide 
where all the solution concepts have been applied, and the noise 
study where due to a lack of time only the hierarchic solution 
was applied. 
If in the case of carbon dioxide the impactee is more 
cautious than the regulator, a region of possible payoffs is 
that in the following Figure 2, assuming that the producer acts 
rationally. 
EQUILIBRIUM 1 
IMPACTEE PROJECTION OF THE 
REGION OF POSSIBLE PAYOFFS 
CR-C CR-C 
Equilibrium 1: (c2 7,c5 + cI) 
C1-C C1-C 
Equilibrium 2: (c2 c5 1 
Figure 2. Payoff Diagram 
for Regulator and Impactee (CR > CI) 
The Pareto-optimal points Equilibrium 1 and Equilibrium 2 
actually stem from equilibrium points. It is obvious that 
Equilibrium 2 is an approximation of the bliss-optimal point 
and the Nash solution. The hierarchic solution concept, 
however, yields Equilibrium 1 as payoff vector. From the 
formulas given below Figure 2, one can see the parameters 
that determine the solution. The analysis has yielded strate- 
gies of the impactee that can be taken as an assessment of a 
response function. This oversimplified model already confirms 
the dominating importance of the parameters CR and CI. 
The noise study once more demonstrates that the framework 
is broad enough for a variety of cases. While in some cases 
extensions might be appropriate, it seems that there exist 
basic features of the pollution problem, the structuring of 
which would specialize the framework in greater detail, thus 
rendering it much more powerful. One such feature is the 
monitoring aspect or surveillance whether the producer operates 
within the standard. Since there is an analysis of this problem in 
D. v. Winterfeldt, 1978, 1, and since both authors have know- 
ledge of the inspection problem (R. Avenhaus, 1977), (R. Avenhaus, 
E. Hapfinger, 1970), ( E .  Hapfinger, 1975), this problem has 
been postponed especially since the approach of M. Maschler, 
1966, where the inspector announces his inspection strategy, 
can apparently be carried over without too many difficulties. 
One other aspect not fully treated is the way of modification 
of subjective probabilities if new data are available. For an 
introduction, we refer to M.H. DeGrout (1970),and T.S. Ferguson 
(1967). 
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